This paper presents how state consistency among distributed control nodes is maintained in the presence of faults. We analyze a fault-tolerant semi-synchronous architecture concept of a Distributed Flight Control System (DFCS). This architecture has been shown robust against transient faults of continuous signals through inherent replica consistency [l]. This approach necessitates neither atomic broadcast nor replica determinism. Here, we extend the analysis of replica consistency property to confirm robustness against transient faults in discrete signals in presence of a single permanent fault in the DFCS components. The paper is based on a case study on JAS 39 Gripen, a modem fourth generation multi purpose combat aircraft, presently operating with a centralized FCS. Our goal is to design the DFCS fault management mechanisms so that the distributed treatment of faults corresponds to the existing non-distributed FCS.
Introduction
The consistency problem in distributed replicas is a well-known problem in aerospace control systems. Already the SIFT project [2] recognized and solved the problem with exact voting. In this paper we revisit the consistency issue in the context of a very different hardware architecture. The theoretical approach for redundancy management of fault-tolerant (FT) systems often calls for exact bit-the interface component, and completes the consistency analysis of DFCSs' fault handling mechanisms. Faults and fault combinations presented in [6] are included here for completeness of the picture.
The analysis is built up in two stages. First, overall safety requirements are stated in terms of desired properties of a distributed flight controller, with focus on discrete mode changes. For example, prescribing that a distributed controller acts in a similar way to the centralized one, when a major fault causes a flight control surface to disengage. This results in (informal) formulation of safety and bounded response properties. In the second stage, a careful analysis and listing of possible transient and permanent faults in every component of the architecture shows that no potential combination of single permanent and single transient faults violates the stated requirements.
Note that design faults are excluded from the class of permanent faults studied here. Several methods to reduce design faults, including formal verification are incorporated in the development process of safety-critical software and electronics under consideration here [7] .
section presents the hardware architecture, followed by the system structure and fault model followed by the DFCS fault management mechanisms.
Maintaining consistency in presence of faults is
The paper is divided into 6 sections. The next Accelerometer analyzed in the next to last section and the final section concludes the paper.
The Distributed FCS Architecture
JAS 39 Gripen has seven primary and three secondary control surfaces, all controlled by the FCS. In the distributed architecture, the critical sensor nodes and the bus are duplicated, while the seven actuator nodes are simplex, one at each primary control surface, see Figure 1 . The reasons for studying a distributed solution compared to a centralized one are beyond the scope of this paper, but among the reasons one can mention: less weight, use of new technology in intelligent sensor and actuator nodes giving rise to redundant computational resources that can be used up this way, and finally fewer components leading to lower risk of breakdowns.
Each primary control surface can operate in one of two modes, the normal mode (fault free) and the streamlining mode (in presence of permanent faults). During normal mode the FCS controls the surface. In streamlining mode the surface is i?ee to follow the aerodynamic forces affecting it. In this mode the surface will not add any lift force and will therefore have minor impact on the movement of the aircraft. The aircraft is still controllable and able to perform safe landing even when one primary control surface is streamlining. Hardware replication (sensor and cockpit nodes, and bus) i s required for the system to meet the safety requirements despite single permanent faults. This implies that no transient faults should lead to hardware losses. We will come back to this issue when considering the requirements imposed on the DFCS.
All control software of today's centralized flight control system is replicated at all seven actuator nodes in the distributed configuration, hence achieving a massive redundancy (seven redundant control computers compared to three of today's). The actuator nodes redundantly calculate all control commands and exchange them over the broadcast bus. Hence, each actuator has its own result plus the other actuators' results for comparison. Our thesis on distributed control nodes is as follows: Distributed control systems can be designed to be inherently consistent, meaning that transient faults can be recovered from within a bounded time limit.
nodes is synchronized using Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) according to protocols as e.g. TTP/C, FlexRay or TT-CAN, while the actuator nodes are semi-synchronous, i.e. the nodes are synchronized every cycle by the bus but running asynchronously in the meantime. Thus, the nodes will not be strictly replica consistent but inherently replica consistent, where errors caused by transient faults can be tolerated and inherently recovered from. Below we will show how the consistency
The communication between the distributed among distributed control nodes in presence of various faults can and will be maintained, thereby making them replica consistent.
System Structure and Fault Model
In the distributed FCS illustrated in Figure 1 , all control and logic as well as fault handling mechanisms is allocated to the actuator nodes. The sensors can be viewed as data sources. Consequently, the following reasoning concerns the actuator nodes and their functions.
The Actuator Functions
digital part (a computer) and one electromechanical part including servo and control surface. The digital part can experience both transient and permanent faults, whereas the electromechanical part experiences only permanent ones.
that will be further discussed below: Interface, Sensor Adaptation and Fault Handling (AFH), Control Law Computation (CLC), Voter, Monitoring, and Loop Closure. In the distributed case, the CLC is identical to the present central FCS, and Monitoring and AFH are similar (but not identical). Hence, our goal is to verify that changes to the design, including the inherent replica consistency concept, lead to adequate fault handling with specific emphasis on the added Voter comDonent.
The actuator, depicted in Figure 2 , has one
The digital part is divided into six functions 
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The interface component is of course important and will be analyzed in detail. Potential design changes in the loop closure and the electromechanical part will not be discussed below.
We now describe the digital functions in each box in more detail. The dataflow denoted by numbered arrows is described in next section.
is to deal with the incoming and outgoing messages on the bus, in effect implementing the TDMA protocol. Particular for this analysis is the incoming sensor signals and the exchange of actuator messages.
Adaptation and Fault Handling (AFH).
Here, adaptation of sensor signals are performed as well as detection and handling of faulty sensors.
Knowledge of system and sensor's behavior is used to pinpoint a faulty sensor with high coverage.
Control Law Computation (CLC). This unit implements algorithms that perform stability and control computations. They change depending on which flight phase (e.g. landing, start etc.) the aircraft is currently performing. The JAS 39 Gripen aircraft can operate in nine different phases, one at a time. Depending on actual operating phase the CLC can operate in different modes, e.g. the pilot can choose to engage modes for holding the aircraft at a certain altitude, automatic aiming etc. In this paper we focus on the fault handling modes. -In particular, the reconfigured modes that might be selected in the CLC to compensate a streamlining surface.
Voter. The voter is a key element for the fault handling mechanisms of the DFCS and its purpose is twofold. First, for the continuous signals the voter algorithm selects one out of seven command words in each TDMA round by taking the mean value. In this way, faulty values are detected and masked, and erroneous command words are prevented from propagating to a control surface. Second, for the discrete signals, i.e. mode status, the algorithms will assure mode changes to be synchronous and the actuators' states consistent via exact (majority) voting and deferring the decision one cycle.
Monitoring. This component monitors the behavior of both the digital part and the electro mechanical part (using the control surface's position sensor, S in Fig. 2) . It emits the Alive Interface. The main purpose for the interface
BUSl
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Signal that prevents the control surface from streamlining. As long as the monitoring qualifies the node as being healthy it issues the Alive Signal but if the node is not qualified the Alive Signal is not issued and the servo streamlines the control surface. The monitor function is as important as the Voter to achieve required FT, but is left out at this stage where focus is on consistency of the distributed Voters.
... AI
... A7
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The numbered arrows in Figure 2 show the data flow within a node and we limit the details on data flow to those signals that are important for the FT analysis later on. In Figure 2 Faults in the actuator's electro mechanical parts lead to permanent disengagement of its control surface.
Fault Handling and Redundancy Management
We begin this chapter by stating the fault handling requirements on the DFCS as well as the assumptions used in the analysis.
The Fault HandIing Requirements of DFCS
The analysis of adequacy of fault management in the DFCS, i.e. in the actuator nodes, depends on the high level requirements placed on the control system. In this section we list a number of major requirements that should be ensured by the distributed design. 
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Requirement 2: The distributed actuator nodes behave as one with respect to the discrete signals, in particular the mode status. This is an obvious requirement for any distributed control system (a kind of correctness requirement). However, to make it more concrete, we consider it in terms of a combination of the two following properties. Requirement 2.1: Mode changes will be reflected in the control decisions taken by all actuator nodes. The decision will be taken simultaneously in all nodes within a given bound.
To be more precise, some permanent physical faults will cause a control surface to streamline. If this happens, it will be reflected in the control decisions taken by all remaining 6 actuator nodes. Moreover, this change takes place within a predefined number of cycles, and all actuators change control law in the very same TDMA cycle. At the heart of these requirements lies the inherent consistency property (Requirement 2). As mentioned earlier, one primary control surface streamlining is not a critical situation, the aircraft can still be well controlled and perform safe landing. From real flight experience it is known that reconfiguration in the case of a control surface streamlining is performed in a safe and correct way by today's centralized FCS. Additionally, for the distributed case we must ensure the inherent consistency property (Requirement 2). First the correct working actuator nodes must agree upon which surface is streamlining and secondly they must change mode simultaneously, within some time limit small enough not to jeopardize the stabilization of the aircraft, i.e. they reconfigure synchronously.
to ensure that the distributed design does not violate the above identified requirements. The analysis is based on the detailed fault handling mechanisms in Section 4.2 and the following three assumptions.
In Chapter 5 the FT mechanisms are analyzed No "babbling idiots": The nodes are failsilent in the temporal domain. Independent buses. Very high fault/error detection coverage is assured through message synchronization mechanisms and CRC at all messages.
Actuator Fault Handling Mechanisms
In this section we present detection and handling mechanisms for the faults described in Section 3.3. All detection and handling is performed simultaneously within each actuator. Table 1 gives an overview of the mechanisms, and implicitly presents some dependencies that will appear in the analysis of distributed fault tolerance.
The DFCS cannot recover from permanent faults during runtime, instead the infected area or node is lost, giving a redundancy loss of the system. Permanent faults of sensors and buses are tolerated by hardware redundancy and the system impact of such faults is redundancy loss. A fault in a sensor node can result in either a) the node's fault detection mechanisms discover the fault and report this in its next broadcast message orb) the fault is not detected in the sensor and an erroneous value is then broadcasted on the bus. Erroneous input sensor values will be detected and isolated in the AFH by comparison e.g., assertion checks [SI, range, min / max derivate etc.
Most permanent actuator faults, e.g. interface, voter, monitoring, servo, control surface, (monitor, voter and interface programs are checked by checksum calculation and coded variables.) must lead to streamlining of the affected control surface followed by a reconfiguration, by which the remaining six control surfaces must compensate for the missing surface. mechanisms of the DFCS. As the table shows, there are 5 faults (rows) in which the system will resort to reconfigured mode to compensate for a streamlining control surface. These fault-bandling scenarios will be further considered in next chapter. 
Analysis of the FT Mechanisms of Actuator Nodes
The system is not designed to cover two arbitrary permanent faults. Hence Inconsistency cannot happen since al actuator nodes receive the same messages.
.
--.
Inconsistency cannot happen since a1 actuator nodes receive messages on the duplicated correct bus.
Actuatorp will perform the CLC on i different set of sensor values (Sa) Inconsistency cannot happen since a1 actuator nodes receive the same actuator messages, or p vote on different set of actuator messages. Masked by voter.
Weak bus-drivers might result in a transmitted "1" or "0" are received differently, Ap is seen faulty by a subset of the actuator nodes. Masked b~ voter. .
All voters vote on 6 correct vectors and one faulty @'s).
The faulty command word in Ap propagates to the loop closure, this is OK for shorter periods due to the inertia of the aircraft, and does not However, a Byzantine behavior from one of the nodes, causing inconsistency in identifying a faulty node is not resolved by the DFCS algorithm nor by the fault handling mechanisms. The fault is tolerated by majority voting. (With seven nodes, two such faults can be tolerated.) the analysis shows that all seven voters take the decision on reconfiguration simultaneously and within a certain number of cycles. In next sections, we show that this property (reconfiguration in the same cycle) will not be affected by a concurrent fault.
For permanent faults that lead to streamlining Table 3 Cycle j: The control law computation is in normal mode, modeVg, in all actuator nodes, AI.,. Ap cannot communicate on either one of the buses.
Cycle j+l:
The DFCS is still operating in normal mode. Since 4 is silent the correct working actuators issue the streamlining flag of actuatorp, E, , . AQ fmds out that the other actuators believe it is faulty and must disengage its control surface. Cycle j+Z: CLC is computed in reconfigured mode, mode:, in the six correct working actuators. Hence, reconfiguration takes place in the same TDMA cycle i.e. streamlining and synchronous reconfiguration. 
Cycle j:
The control law computation is in normal mode, mode:, in all actuator nodes, AI., , and A, flags for streamlining,
The DFCS is still operating in normal mode, but all actuators have now recognized that control surfacep is streamlining, E, , , and due to majority decision in the voter the next computation will be in reconfigured mode. Cycle j+Z: CLC is computed in reconfigured mode, mode:, in all actuators. Hence, reconfiguration takes place in the same TDMA cycle i.e. streamlining and synchronous reconfiguration.
thus, stopped issuing the Alive Signal, a, (seen by 0).
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neither lead to streamlining (Requirement 1) nor inconsistency with respect to discrete signals (Requirement 2.1). 
Concurrent Transient Faults
In this section we show ( 
Combined Permanent and Transient Faults
Here we show that the actuator nodes of the DFCS behave as one with respect to the discrete signals also for combination of transient and permanent faults (Requirement 2.1). The analysis leaves out permanent faults that result in redundancy loss only and focus on those treated with mode change, i.e. reconfiguration. The single permanent actuator faults in Table 3 are combined with the transient faults from Table 2 and analyzed in Table 5 Case I: Actuator node p permanently faulty and in the same TDMA cycle is sensor, Si', affected by a transient. Table 3 .
Again, for Type A faults 5, is set in cycle j+l because actnator node p is silent instead of issuing streamlining. Cycle j to j+2: i) the computed command words will be slightly different, U',, this will sustain in the system ii) node q has a reduced number of actuator vectors to vote on in cycle j+l, might missp issuing streamlining iii) node q votes on 1 correct vectors, the others on 6 in TDMA cycle j All versions are reduced to the single permanent fault case in Table 3 , Type A iii) node q votes on 6 correct vectors, the others on 5 in cycle j
Case IV Actuatorp issues streamlining (or is silent) and actuator q has faulty discrete signal i.e. q flags for streamlining, t. 
Concluding Remarks
The analysis of the DFCS even as an informal reasoning process has not been a trivial task.
Having done this analysis, we have completed the replica consistency property that was initiated in [6] for discrete signals, and in [l] covering continuous signals. In this paper, we have concentrated on presenting the likely fault scenarios and the essential fault handling mechanisms that ensure a correct distribution of the flight control function. In particular, we showed that the semi-synchronous approach with inherent replica consistency is robust against transient faults and distributed treatment of faults corresponds to the centralized FCS, i.e. the DFCS behaves as one. The correctness of the implemented distribution with respect to welldefined combinations of transient and permanent faults (that might affect continuous or discrete values) has been shown and is the major contribution of this paper. Thus, a valuable input to the system safety and reliability analysis has been rigorously documented. Future works include detailing the design, especially the voter, at a formal level where the analysis can be checked by employment of formal verification tools.
